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Europe has constructed a world-class digital identity and verification infrastructure for its public 
services. If it encourages and pushes the private sector to leverage and build on this 
accomplishment, the continent is poised to reap significant social, political and economic 
benefits.  
The Covid-19 pandemic makes progress in digital identity and verification more pressing than 
ever. Digital verification helps people prove their identity without having to travel in person to 
a store or a government office. During the crisis, it has enabled consumers to buy goods and 
services and prove their age online and allowed furloughed students to take exams. Digital 
identity and verification is the ultimate social distancing tool. Even after the pandemic subsides, 
implementation of effective contactless identification will be required to unlock social and 
economic benefits.  
Identity verification is critical to the economy. It isn’t a ‘nice to have.’ It already is a regulatory 
requirement in many sectors, beginning with the financial industry. And yet while the internet 
makes it easy to grow businesses online, identity verification remains an area that continues to 
require physical interaction. The lack of robust, easy-to-use digital identity and verification has 
onerous, complex and costly consequences for all businesses, particularly start-ups and small 
enterprises. 
Consider a few scenarios to understand why this is the case: 
• Log into a bank in any European member country and request a mortgage. There is no 
need to upload reams of financial data, no requirement to mail or even scan and email a 
copy of your passport or other identity document. Via a mobile app, the bank receives 
secure verification of one’s financial history, allowing it to approve or deny the loan 
request within seconds.   
• Walk into an airport. There is no need to carry a boarding pass. Because airline 
documentation is linked to government-issued identity and verification documents, you 
proceed straight to security. Data protection concerns are allayed because the 
information is transferred via secure blockchain. The security check itself will be swift and 
almost painless, since security staff will be informed of previous clearances. 
• The Belgian drinking age is 18. On their 18th birthday, a young Belgian wants to celebrate 
with a bottle of nice wine. They don’t want the seller to know anything else about them 
other than their age – not their gender, name or nationality. Under Europe’s new cross-
border identity scheme, it is possible to provide the right amount of information – and 
no more. 
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As these examples demonstrate, digital verification goes far beyond an electronic identity card 
or an electronic signature that proves one’s identity and consent. This is digital identification. 
By digital verification, we mean the collection of data verifying both identity and credentials – 
academic, financial and educational– which can be transmitted remotely in non-paper form.  
While pursuing this seamless digital verification future, Europe must avoid creating a 
surveillance state. No one wants governments or public authorities to accumulate large 
amounts of sensitive information stored in digital form, which can be hacked, stolen or misused. 
Nor does one want to create a centralised ‘digital identity’ that could lock out legitimate users 
by mistakenly identifying them as 'bad actors', preventing them from buying, selling, or 
transferring money or information. As governments and industry work together to solve the 
technical challenges, both must remain aware of these crucial data protection concerns.  
But the truth is that digital identification and verification offer opportunities to improve security 
and data protection, when compared to the high-risk collection and storage of paper 
documentation. Paper documents are easy to falsify. They may be stolen or lost and misused.  
Secure encrypted blockchain or other types of privacy-protected digital verification avoid these 
risks. Constructed with care, they must comply with the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and fit well into the European Commission’s data strategy of 
February 2020, which supports the establishment of “common European data spaces,” 
promoting the creation of “secure and universally usable digital identities.”1   
This report argues that Europe enjoys a huge opportunity to achieve its goal of secure, data 
protection-respecting digital verification. Today, governments control most forms of 
verification with passports and other government-issued credentials. Under the new 
regulation, it should be possible to allow individual European citizens to generate and control 
their own identity and credentials and to reveal the minimal information required by the 
application. An effective digital verification system will represent a major step forward to allow 
Europe to construct an effective digital single market.    
The report will focus on Europe’s government-led authentication programmes and how the 
private sector can build on it. It will not discuss in depth private sector initiatives led by Big Tech 
companies such as Apple, Google and Facebook. These initiatives do not offer legal certainty 
and they raise regulatory issues outside the scope of this study.  Apple knows the apps that you 
purchase, Google follows your search history; Facebook hosts your social history and all three 
have developed secure double authentication.  Europe could encourage – or force - internet 
giants such as Facebook and Google to build privacy-protected digital verification. The 
Commission’s June 2020 consultation for its main regulatory digital initiative, the Digital 
Services Act, includes questions about digital identity and the measure of control exerted by 
Big Tech over it. 
 
1 European Commission, (2020b), “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European strategy for data, 
2020. 
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Present-day verification often represents a time-consuming, arduous process, often requiring 
paper documentation. A passport, proof of address, driver’s licence must be produced, along 
with a myriad of certifications guaranteeing credentials. Often, a physical face to face meeting 
is needed. Even if a physical meeting is not required, it can take days, even weeks to verify the 
validity of documents – such as nursing certifications, credit scores or corporate registrations. 
Europe has made a strong start. Many of the continent’s national digital verification 
programmes are world-class, including the government-led Belgian programme and a bank-led 
Nordic regional effort.  
The European Union has constructed a unique cross-border electronic identification 
infrastructure with digitally linked verification (eID) and interoperable electronic authentication 
(eIDAS). To date, 12 European Union members plus the United Kingdom have given notice of 
their eID plans, with Denmark almost ready to notify and Latvia launching its process. A full list 
can be found on the European Commission’s website.2 A new Single Digital Gateway is being 
built that will allow citizens and companies moving to another EU member state to register 
their car or claim pension benefits without any physical paperwork.3 
The European Union is the first and only region in the world where digital ID and verification 
are provided securely and are enforceable legally. The European Commission’s vision is clear:  
to allow “people, companies  (in particular SMEs) and public administrations to safely access 
services and do transactions online and across borders in one click.”4  European Union citizens 
should enjoy security and convenience “for any online activity such as submitting tax 
declarations, enrolling in a foreign university, remotely opening a bank account, setting up a 
business in another member state, authenticating for internet payments, bidding to on line call 
for tender.”5 If this goal is reached, studies from the World Bank, McKinsey and others show 
that the European economy could receive a boost of up to 3% of GDP.6 
Bold steps are required to realise this windfall, however. The new European Commission (in 
office since December 2019) recently finished a public consultation on the eIDAS evaluation 
roadmap7 and will soon be considering policy changes, including possible changes to existing 
legislation to increase the private sector use of this digital verification infrastructure.8   
The issue has taken on greater urgency since the Covid-19 crisis. At their meeting in March 
2020, European leaders discussed an initiative titled European Digital Identity, “with the aim of 
developing an EU-wide digital identity that allows for a simple, trusted and secure public system 
 
2 European Commission, (2019d), “Overview of Pre-Notified and Notified eID Schemes Under eIDAS.” 
3 European Commission, (2018d), “The single digital gateway.” 
4 European Commission, (2018a), “Trust Services and Electronic identification (eID).” 
5 Ibid.  
6 J. Manyika, S. Lund, M. Singer, O. White, O, C. Berry, (2016), Digital Finance for All: Powering Inclusive Growth in 
Emerging Economies, McKinsey Global Institute. 
7 European Commission, (2019f), “Secure electronic transactions – application of EU rules (report)  
8 Ibid. 
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for citizens to identify themselves in the digital space by 2027,” according to the European 
Council’s draft conclusions. 9 Though never formally adopted, the draft has encouraged the 
European Commission to come up with proposals by the end of 2020 and to revise the eIDAS 
Regulation. 
This paper aims to add to this public debate and push forward regulatory moves to increase 
the deployment and uptake of digital verification, both within and across the borders of the 
European Union.   
Europe’s digital verification ambitions avoid most of the emerging political tensions about how 
to regulate Big Tech. While governments and internet companies will be contesting questions 
ranging from liability to content moderation and copyright, regulators and businesses agree on 
the necessity of building an effective digital verification system. This consensus allows both 
sides to work together in a constructive manner.  
Despite this consensus, some sensitive challenging choices remain. Data protection and 
security concerns must be addressed.  National objections to accepting other EU members 
decisions on authorising digital credentials must be overcome. The potential payoff is too large 
to ignore. Europe has a giant opportunity to become the leader in cross-border digital 
verification and take important steps to improving its single market and competitiveness. 
  
 
9 L. Kayli, (2020), “EU Leaders Want a ‘European Digital Identity’ by 2027,” Politico, Morning Tech Europe, March 10.  
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1. The Global Identification Challenge  
Throughout the world, a lack of accurate, trustworthy identification and verification represents 
a major economic and social drag. 
The problem is most pressing in the developing world. Approximately one billion people lack a 
legally identified form of identification.10 They have no birth certificate, no identity card, no 
passport or no driver’s licence. Without identification they “may be denied access to critical 
government and economic services,” McKinsey Research reports.11 
Digital ID is only part of this story. The utility of a government-issued paper or digital 
identification depends on what information it contains and what type of services it can unlock. 
Does it just show where and when one is born? That is enough to prove that a teenager ordering 
an alcoholic drink is legal. It will not prove eligibility to obtain a mortgage or prove the 
credentials to work as a nurse or doctor. These tasks require one’s financial information and 
education credentials. Throughout this paper, we will use the term digital verification to 
represent a broad definition of credentials-based authentication. 
Most digital verification systems, even in the developed world, remain primitive. About 3.4 
billion people own some form of officially recognised identity but with limited ability to use it 
in the digital world. The remaining 3.2 billion, mainly in Europe and other developed countries, 
benefit from digital ID – and what McKinsey describes as a “digital trail,” the ability to leverage 
identity online in an effective and efficient way. Even lucky Europeans with a digital identity are 
often unable to accomplish complicated tasks requiring significant amounts of verified 
credentials-based information.12 
Weak or non-existent digital verification represents a considerable cost and administrative 
hurdle. On average, today, businesses in Europe spend six to seven weeks verifying the identity 
of potential business partners or clients before starting to conduct business.13 A few real-world, 
contemporary European examples illustrate the challenge. 
• A Belgian citizen needs to open a bank account for a Dutch foundation. No 
Belgian bank will provide this service. The Belgian must travel across the border 
in person, prove his or her identity, show the notarised paper registration of the 
foundation, the original paper Chamber of Commerce credentials and sign the 
 
10 World Bank, (2018), ID4D Data: Global Identification Challenge by the Numbers.  
11 White, A. Madgavkar, J. Manyika, D. Mahajan, J. Bughin, M. McCarthy, & O. Sperling, (2019), Digital 
identification: A key to inclusive growth. Executive summary. McKinsey Global Institute.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation, (2017), The Legal Entity Identifier: The Value of the Unique 
Counterparty ID. 
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bank account papers before a watching bank officer. In fact, they cannot do this 
alone. The bank requires two officers of the foundation to be present in 
person.14 
• An Irish fin-tech company wants to onboard a Greek merchant for its payment 
service. A dozen different paper forms, full of official stamps, are required. Each 
European Union country has different rules on registration and on what 
percentage of shareholding requires authentication. The paper chase slows the 
company’s pan-European rollout.15 
• When a Swedish resident marries a Slovak citizen in Slovakia, it takes months of 
visits to different government offices to register the marriage and name change. 
The obstacles make it difficult for the wife to receive working papers or open a 
bank account and can create friction in the young marriage.16 
If trustworthy digital identification and verification became the norm, these painful bottlenecks 
could be lifted, unlocking what has been estimated as time savings of 110 billion hours through 
streamlined access to public and private sector services.17 Improved customer registration 
could reduce onboarding costs by up to 90%, and reduce payroll fraud, saving up to $1.6 trillion 
globally.18 
For emerging economies, effective digital identification and verification could boost GDP by an 
average of 6% by 2030.19 Some major developing countries could benefit even more: digital ID 
could unlock an additional 13% of GDP in Brazil by 2030.20 Some 39 million Brazilians now 
without bank accounts could be able to open one. Other big potential beneficiaries include 
Nigeria (7%), and India (6%). Of the 1.7 billion people without a bank account in 2017, one in 
five blamed the lack of necessary identification documents.21 
Women in the developing world will benefit most since they disproportionately lack 
identification.22 Some 45% of women over the age of 15 live without identity papers in low 
income countries, compared to only 30% of men.23 According to the World Bank “Increasing 
the identification of women can improve their inclusion and autonomy.” When Pakistan used 
its national digital ID database, the government was able to make cash transfers to women for 
 
14 Author experience. 
15 Stripe company interview. 
16 Personal interview with author. 
17 Manyika et al., op. cit. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 White et al., op.cit. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Clark, J., Dahan, M., Desai, V., Ienco, M., de Labriolle, S., Pellestor, J.-P., … Varuhaki, Y. (2016), “Digital Identity : 
Towards Shared Principles for Public and Private Sector Cooperation”, World Bank Group-GSMA. 
23 World Bank. (2018). ID4D Data: Global Identification Challenge by the Numbers. 
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the first time – and a greater portion of household income was spent on nutrition and education 
than when the money went directly to men. 
Although the potential upshot for developed European economies is not quite as revolutionary, 
it remains impressive. McKinsey estimates digital identification and verification could unlock an 
average of 3% of mature economies such as those of the US and Europe.24  
Job searches will be eased. Digital identification and verification could, if used well, verify 
credentials and references, thereby eliminating background checks and allowing faster 
onboarding for both permanent and part-time gig positions. 
Governments will see a potential boost in their tax revenues and a streamlining of their 
services. Estonians vote online, which authorities estimate saves 11,000 working days per 
election.25 This is for a country counting a mere 1.3 million citizens.  
Digital identity and verification would also improve tax collection. The International Monetary 
Fund believes that digitisation could broaden tax bases while streamlining tax filing.26 
Perhaps the biggest boost will come to finance. New customers would not have to visit a bank 
branch to open an account or obtain a mortgage. Financial institutions must, by law, verify the 
identity of their merchants to comply with Know Your Customer and Anti-Money Laundering 
regulations.27 In the UK, almost a third of financial applications are abandoned due to 
difficulties in registration. With digital verification, businesses will onboard clients in as little 
time as it takes for them to click ‘login’ on a mobile device. McKinsey estimates that the cost of 
providing digital accounts are 80% to 90% lower than using physical branches.28  
The technology required to carry out a digital identification and verification programme is 
available – and its price is coming down fast. Biometric authentication, fingerprint sensors and 
bar codes may be leveraged to create secure signature or facial recognition. Blockchain is 
emerging as a viable way to allow the storage of data.  
Keeping personal data secure is key – as is respecting human rights. In 2018, two German media 
companies analysed 2,000 credit reports, and found that many individuals received a negative 
rating despite never having defaulted on loans.29 In February 2020, Dutch judges ruled illegal 
the government’s algorithmic risk scoring system that used profiled citizens to predict the 
likelihood that social security claimants would commit benefits or tax fraud. Human rights 
campaigners have dubbed it a “welfare surveillance state.”30  
 
24 White et al., op.cit.. 
25 E-Estonia, (n.d), E-identity: ID Card.  
26 S. Gupta, M.  Keen, A. Shah, & G. Verdier, (Eds.), (2017), Digital Revolutions in Public Finance. International 
Monetary Fund. 
27White et al., op.cit. 
28 Ibid. 
29Algorithm Watch, (2018), “SCHUFA a black box: OpenSCHUFA results published.” 
30 N. Lomas, (2020), “Blackbox welfare fraud detection system breaches human rights, Dutch court rules,” Tech 
Crunch, February 6. 
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A more mundane obstacle is unifying different European Know Your Customer regulatory 
frames, according to Francesco Cardi, Chief Strategy Officer of the digital verification leader 
Onfido. Ireland and the Netherlands take a ‘risk-based’ approach to digital verification, leaving 
to regulated entities the freedom to apply a wide set of measures, depending on the risk level 
associated with the use case. In these countries, banks are allowed to verify low-risk use cases 
with a simple third party database hit (typically, credit rating agencies), and handle high-risk 
cases by asking the user for legal documents and recorded videos or photos. Other EU members 
adopt a stricter approach, requiring a check of the user’s legal documents and biometrics for 
all cases. For instance, in Germany and Spain banks must conduct live video call when 
onboarding each customer."31 
As Europe moves to gain the full benefit of digital identification and verification, it must be 
careful to overcome these obstacles and dangers.  
  
 
31 Interview, Francesco Cardi, 17 March 2020. 
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2. Europe and Digital Verification 
Europe’s impressive journey to digital identification and verification has been long and arduous. 
Interoperability is easy to envision but expensive and difficult to achieve. The continent must 
overcome its different national legal frameworks and a multitude of different technical 
standards,” notes a European Commission report.32 
Europe’s digital identity schemes remain fragmented, due to different historical and cultural 
attitudes among the 27 European Union member states. Under EU rules, national governments 
remain responsible for issuing identity. While countries such as Italy, Germany, Spain and 
Belgium long have had national identity cards, the UK and Denmark have no accepted national 
identity system and civil liberty motivated resistance to government-controlled proof of 
identity remains strong.   
Because of their different histories and cultures, EU member states today rely on different 
types of digital identity cards, driver licences, or, among the Nordic countries, bank IDs. Within 
the EU27, 86 different versions of ID cards and 181 type of residence documents exist, says 
Pierre-Jean Verrando, Director General of the Eurosmart, a trade association for digital security 
companies.33  
Instead of seeing this fragmentation as a disadvantage and insisting on a one-size-fits all 
formula, the European Commission has accepted the diversity and attempted to take 
advantage of it. EU policy focuses on securing desired common verification outcomes while 
relying on each nation’s identity infrastructure. National verification schemes bring benefits. 
They build on existing national infrastructure and allow for digital verification to be tailored 
local markets and conditions; there is no need for a single accepted national identity card or a 
single accepted set of verified credentials. It should not matter, in theory, if a smart card, bank 
card, or SIM/mobile phone device is used for holding and transmitting identity credentials. 
What is needed is to ease mutual recognition – the process by which European countries 
recognise and accept each other’s national verification schemes. European policy aims to allow 
this interoperability. The European Commission has legislated and built an ambitious digital ID 
and verification system. Three basic building blocks buttress the European effort: 
1. ID Cards: In 2006, the European Union agreed on a common design and minimum-
security standards for national identity cards. Cards must be made of laminated paper 
and contain name, birth date, nationality, photo signature, card number and end date 
of validity. Some cards contain more information, such as height and eye colour. 
 
32 European Commission, (n.d.-a), Electronic Identities – a brief introduction. 
33 P. J. Verrando, (2019), “New EU eID cards regulation - a big move to keep a step ahead”. Presentation: The 
Identity Conference, Eurosmart. 
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Importantly, countries are not required to issue such electronic identity cards, and some 
do not, for a variety of reasons ranging from the cost, in Greece, to fears of impinging 
upon civil liberties, in Denmark.34 
2. eIDAS: The 2014 European Union regulation on electronic identification, authentication 
and trust services encourages member states to build and recognise private and public 
cross-border electronic identity verification systems.35 Trust services do not depend on 
a physical ID card. They work with other types of verified national electronic 
identification schemes and credentials. eIDAS provides the legal framework for a market 
of trust services. Mutual recognition between EU members and cross-border legal 
certainty is crucial. 
This is where the acronyms become confusing. In EU jargon, eID does NOT refer only to 
electronic identity cards, it refers to the wider spectrum of digital identity credentials. 
eIDAS, by contrast, refers to the narrow authentication process, ensuring that electronic 
seals, time stamps and other electronic delivery services “work across borders and have 
the same legal status as traditional paper-based processes.”36 Under eIDAS, trust 
services rely on notified and legally recognised eIDs. 
eIDAS makes it mandatory for European Union public administrations to accept the 
electronic seals and signatures from other countries, whenever they require them at 
national level. A Cooperation Network allows EU members  to achieve interoperability 
and security for their eID schemes. As we will see later, the narrow authentication 
process works well, but the cross-border acceptance of broader digital verification 
remains awkward and inefficient and needs additional refinement and improvement. 
3. Single Digital Gateway: In 2018, the European Union mandated that member states 
must digitise 21 administrative procedures, including a birth certificate, car registration, 
starting a business or submitting a corporate tax declaration by the end of 2023.37 This 
data will be available online through a single EU-wide online portal called Your Europe.” 
Alongside this project, a separate new regulation tightens the security of ID cards.38 
Under the Single Digital Gateway, a French university will finally be able to verify the 
credentials of a German student submitting his or her academic diplomas directly from 
the German university without having to send in notarised paper forms or appear in 
person. The European Commission believes the Single Digital Gateway could save EU 
citizens up to 855 000 hours of their time annually and companies more than EUR 11 
billion per year.39  
 
34 Council of the European Union, (2006), “Draft Resolution of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States meeting within the Council on common minimum security standards for Member States’ national 
identity cards.” 
35 European Commission, (2018a), Digital Single Market Policy: Trust Services and Electronic Identification [eID]. 
36 Ibid. 
37 European Commission, (n.d.-d), op., cit. 
38 Verrando, op., cit.  
39 European Parliament, (2018), “Single digital gateway: a time saver for citizens and companies,” Press Release, 
December 18. 
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The journey towards an interoperable digital European verification system began back in 1999 
with the passage of the Electronic Signatures Directive. It provided a legal framework for the 
recognition of electronic signatures40 across the European Union.  Since then, the Commission 
has developed and financed a series of important steps: 
• In 2006, the Commission published an eGovernment action plan41 urging  member 
states to “establish secure systems for mutual recognition of national electronic identity 
for public administration websites and services.42 The Commission could not force 
member states to comply  - it could only attempt to encourage and mobilise them. 
• In 2008, the Commission introduced a “modular technological infrastructure” called 
STORK, built on top of national eID infrastructure. STORK proved that eIDs could safely 
and securely be used across borders. 
• In 2012, the Commission created the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) which provided 
€870 million for the creation of cross-border digital services in Europe.43  
• In 2013, the Commission launched the Electronic Simple European Networked Services 
(e-SENS). Pilot projects were launched in 22 countries, building up a series of generic IT 
solutions for speeding cross-border identification.44 
These projects shared a goal of improving access to eGovernment public services. Private sector 
applications were neglected. In its 2006 working paper, the Commission listed its priorities as 
“Social Security, Pensions, Health, company registration, certificates and licenses (Drivers and 
vehicles) and Taxation (VAT).”45 
Difficulties soon emerged. The initial Electronic Signatures Directive limited its scope to EU 
public services. As a directive and not a regulation, the directive on eSignatures “left discretion 
over implementation into local law in the hands of member states, leading to a fractured, non-
interoperable set of standards,” the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum in a 2018 study.46 
Each European country continued to enforce a different legal framework for electronic identity 
and the definition of authentication levels. Member countries promoted their own local E-
Signature standards, which were not recognised elsewhere. The Commission itself complained 
 
40 Commission of the European Communities, (2006), Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:“i2010 
eGovernment Action Plan: Accelerating eGovernment in Europe for the Benefit of All.” 
41 Ibid. 
42 D. Tinholt, N. van der Linden, S. Enzerink, R. Geilleit, A. Groeneveld, & G. Cattaneo, (2019), eGovernment 
Benchmark 2019: Empowering Europeans through trusted digital public services, European 
Commission. 
43 European Commission. (n.d.-e), “STORK | Take your e-identity with you, everywhere in the EU,”  
44 eSENS, (2017), “e-SENS – paving the way to the ‘live’ phase of cross-border digital public services.” 
45 European Commission, (n.d.-a), Electronic Identities – a brief introduction. 
46 J. Grandsenne, (2018), “EU BLOCKCHAIN OBSERVATORY AND FORUM: Workshop Report 
e-Identity”, Brussels, November 7, 2018. 
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that the Electronic Signatures Directive made it “de facto impossible to conduct cross-border 
electronic transactions.”47 
E-Signature proved unfit for the new internet age. As Richard Oliphant, EMEA General Counsel 
of the electronic signature company Docusign notes, the regulation “was drafted with 
hardware-based smartcard and handheld USB token technologies in mind and failed to account 
for new technologies that have emerged since 1999, including mobile technologies and the 
Cloud”.48 
Radical change was required and it came in the 2014 eIDAS regulation. eIDAS allowed European 
citizens, provided certain criteria are met, to access public services in other EU member states. 
Unlike the previous voluntary electronic signature directive, eIDAS committed member states 
to “cooperate in order to reach interoperability and security of electronic identification 
schemes”.49 Although eIDAS did not harmonise how member states issue eID credentials, it set 
the criteria by which eID are legally recognised across the Union and mandated the Commission 
to publish detailed criteria that allow member states to map their eID against a security 
benchmark (low, substantial and high).50 Member states must give notice of their electronic 
identification schemes to Brussels. 
eIDAS represented a major element of the ambitious 2015 European Digital Single Market 
strategy. Through 16 initiatives – including an end to unjustified blocking of content at national 
borders, a revamp of copyright, and an overhaul of telecom rules – the Commission attempted 
to unite Europe’s fragmented digital economies into a unified market encompassing more than 
500 million consumers.51 
eIDAS created a European internal market for electronic trust services by ensuring that they 
will work across borders and have the same legal status as traditional paper-based processes. 
The Regulation defines an ‘electronic document’ as any content stored in electronic form, in 
particular text or sound, visual or audio-visual recording, covering ‘blocks’ in a blockchain.52 
eIDAS recognised specific electronic signature types across the entire European Union, 
including: 




48 R.Oliphant, (2016), “Learning from History: The Origins of eIDAS.”  
49 European Commission, (2018c), “Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS): clear Benefits for SMEs.” 
50 Ibid. 
51 W. Echikson (2017), “Europe’s Digital Single Market Gets an F” Huffpost.  
52 European Commission, (2020), “Discover eIDAS.” 
53European Commission, (2019), “CEF eSignature facilitates the first electronic signature on an EU regulation!” 
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• Advanced Electronic Signature: one type of electronic signature with more stringent 
requirements for verifying the signer’s identity and binding it to the document.54 
• Qualified Electronic Signature: another type of electronic signature that meets all the 
requirements of an Advanced Electronic Signature but must be backed by a certificate 
from an organisation certified as a “Qualified Trust Service Provider” and produced 
using “Qualified Signature Creation Device.”55 
Under eIDAS, a qualified electronic signature issued by a trusted service provider established 
in one EU member is valid throughout the Union. This allows electronic verification of diplomas 
and other educational achievements, in theory solving the challenge for a nurse educated in 
one EU member state who seeks work in another member state hospital. He or she no longer 
needs to send a notarised paper certificate; eSignature and eSeal could verify the nursing 
certificate.56 
After five years, a total of 172 qualified trust service providers have been established across the 
European Union. Individual member states have launched ambitious eID schemes and begun 
to experience the benefits of streamlined access to government services such as online tax 
filing and eHealth. Only 65% of the EU population is covered by qualified trusted service 
providers.57   
Crucially, once an eID is legally recognised, the private sector can rely on it for identification 
and authentication. eID and eIDAS are embedded in sector-specific legislation, from new anti-
money laundering to payment services, where it represents a key opportunity to fulfil the Know 
Your Customer requirement.  
Yet failings are visible. Although the signature part of eIDAS has worked well, the broader eID 
part of the scheme to trust each other’s credentials needs improvement. Only 14 out of the 27 
European Union members have ‘notified’ eIDs under eIDAS. Many governments have felt little 
incentive to expend resources, given tight budgets and varying priorities.58 The coordination 
network has proved to be slow and inefficient.  Almost all progress concerns government 
services; the gigantic opportunity of private sector pickup has been missed. 
A wide performance gap is also visible. In its latest benchmark, the European Commission noted 
a large gap between Nordic frontrunners and other countries in the number and scope of public 
services available to be verified and accessed online. While almost 98% of public services are 
available in countries such as Finland and Estonia, less than 40% are available online in Romania, 
Bulgaria and Greece.59 The average European level is close to 65%, with some southern 






58 European Commission, (2019b), op. cit. 
59 Tinholt et al. op. cit.  
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Public and Private Uses of eIDAS 
 
Source: “Trust in a Digital Society” (2018) presentation by Anders Gjøen DG CONNECT, European Commission Unit, 
eGovernment & Trust. 
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The use of of digital identification and verification varies country by country. Estonia and 
Belgian cards allow access to more than 100 applications, from e-Health to public transport. 
Portugal allows e-Tax declarations.60 And yet, many countries offer fewer than a dozen 
applications – and these are only public (not private) applications.61 
Why has the pickup been so different across the continent?  
Once again, part of the challenge is Europe’s diversity. Although member states must comply 
with the security requirements of travel documents and are able to notify their eiD under eIDAS 
trust services, countries approach the challenge in different ways. Belgium operates a 
government-driven centralised system. The Nordics (i.e. the Finns, Swedes, Danes, Norwegians 
and Icelanders) prefer a decentralised, private-sector bank-led system. Some countries accept 
national identity schemes; others reject them out of civil liberty concerns. 
eIDAS mandates the mutual recognition of different national digital verification systems, but 
the continent’s system of peer review to allow cross-border functionality is complicated. Here’s 
how it works – or rather fails to work. A member state notifies others that it has a new eID 
scheme via the Cooperation Network.62 A formal review is scheduled. The Cooperation 
Network appoints a coordinator, a rapporteur, three to five experts, and an observer. The 
rapporteur leads the work, while an observer reviews draft documentation. After the review is 
completed, the committee holds a vote to approve. The coordinator provides “strategic 
oversight” and attempts to mediate disputes.63 A majority is required.  
This is time-consuming. Participants describe peer review sessions for approval as day or 
multiple day-long entailing mind-numbing word-by-word, line-by-line reviews. Some sessions 
involve as many as 70 questions. One regular participant described the process as having 
someone “pick your nose” for hours on end.64  Measures are required to simplify and speed up 
the adoption of digital identity and verification. 
An additional important challenge is security, particularly for physical documents. Some 
European ID and residence documents do not meet international document security standards. 
Even e-leader Estonia’s ID card revealed a security weakness, reports Eurosmart.65  
The dangers of weak digital verification security are serious: in the US, private companies such 
as credit monitor Equifax hold an abundance of data to verify identity and financial history. This 
privately-run system bringing continent-wide data together allows a quick one-stop-shop to 
verify the identity and credentials of more than 300 million American consumers. It also 
increases vulnerabilities. In September 2017, Equifax announced that it had experienced a data 
breach, which impacted the personal information of approximately 147 million people.66  
 
60 Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira, (2020), “Portal das Finanças: Pagamentos.” 
61 Verrando, op. cit. 
62European Commission, (2019), “Single Market Scoreboard.” 
63 Ibid. 
64 E. Van de Wynckel, (2019) Identificatie, Authenticatie en Authorisatie, DG Digitale Transformatie. 
65 Verrando, op. cit. 
66 JND Legal Representatives. (2019), Equifax Data Breach Settlement. 
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Equifax-style scandals underline the priority to protect privacy. In May 2018, Europe rolled out 
the pathbreaking GDPR data protection rules. GDPR includes broad definitions of what 
constitutes personal data, including emails and IP addresses. Under GDPR Europeans enjoy 
strong controls over their digital and identity data, including the right to demand that their data 
be erased and to restrict its use. Europe’s privacy regulators have yet to give guidance on good 
GDPR practices with respect to eID and eIDAS applications. 
GDPR should not present an insurmountable obstacle to digital verification. Under GDPR, 
consent is recognised as one of the alternatives for lawful processing of personal data. Most 
eID and eIDAS applications already obtain consent from users.67 Right to review and erase has 
been implemented in some national eID cards. In Belgium, the country’s ID card allows citizens 
to check which government officials have accessed their data – and to demand an explanation 
as to why their files were accessed. Estonians enjoy similar rights. 
For the private sector, too, data protection rules could improve their own digital identity 
systems. Facebook and Google run what the World Bank calls a “self-asserted digital identity 
ecosystem” where “users choose their own digital identity attributes, and no verification 
against official identity documents is required, resulting in a lower level of security.”68 Logging 
in with Google or Facebook, the Commission fears, will require consumers to “unnecessarily” 
share personal data with “unrelated platforms” to access products or services online. If the 
companies could use effective eIDAS-powered GDPR- compliant identity checks, this 
verification could be improved. We would be sure that a person’s Facebook and Google pages 
were genuine – while ensuring that Facebook and Google only receive the minimum-required 
information from their users.  
For this vision to become a reality, security must be upgraded. Under a European Commission 
proposal, now adopted, ID cards should contain a facial image and two fingerprints and contain 
“sufficient capacity to guarantee the integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of data.” 
Governments are required to exchange the necessary information both “to authenticate the 
storage medium and to “access and verify biometric data.” In addition, e-services must be 
physically or logically separated from the biometric data.69  The European Parliament and 
European Council adopted these proposals this year and they become binding in August 2021.70 
European authorities recognise the challenges to achieve world-class digital verification. The 
European Commission recently closed a public consultation and is considering putting forward 




68 J. Clark, M. Dahan, V. Desai, M. Ienco, S. de Labriolle, J. Pellestor, … Y. Varuhaki, (2016), “Digital Identity : Towards 
Shared Principles for Public and Private Sector Cooperation”, World Bank Group-GSMA.  
69 Ibid 
70 Ibid. 
71 Gobierno de España. (2019), “The European Commission launches the public consultation of eIDAS.” 
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3. Policy Recommendations 
Building a 21st Century Digital Train Network 
Just as Europe is building high-speed trains to crisscross the continent, it should aim to build a 
high-speed digital identification and verification network.  
The figure below explains digital identity train travel. A Spaniard wants to ‘travel’ digitally to 
Sweden to benefit from a Swedish fin-tech service. He or she buys a digital train ticket in Spain 
that represents his or her verified digital identity and boards the train in Spain. The train speeds 
to Sweden and stops at a Swedish node station, where the identity is verified and sent on for 
use at the fin-tech company.  
Europe’s Digital Identity Train 
Source: Geoff Skelly, CEPS. 
The vision that corresponds to this conception is a decentralised identity and verification 
system. Instead of a government or other central authority holding personal information, the 
goal “is to put the user at the centre of the framework and so remove the need for third parties 
to issue and administer identity,” according to the EU Blockchain Observatory.72 “This goal can 
be achieved by putting as much of the identity infrastructure as possible in the users’ hands 
and otherwise relying on trustworthy decentralised methods” such as blockchain “without the 
 
72 T. Lyons, L. Courcelas & K. Timsit, K. (2019), Blockchain and Digital Identity, The European Union Blockchain 
Observatory and Forum. https://www.eublockchainforum.eu/sites/default/files/report_identity_v0.9.4.pdf 
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need for a third-party authority.” Users create their own digital identities and attach 
information to their identity from trusted authorities.  
Although European Commission officials are correct in proclaiming their digital verification 
framework as a global leader, it has failed to gain widespread daily pickup.  Europe should be 
bold, expand the scope of effort and simplify its implementation. It should create an inclusive 
system, one that works for all European Union citizens, not just those that own the latest 
smartphones – and it should reassure privacy-sensitive Europeans that they continue to own 
and control access to their own data.  
Our recommendations to achieve these ambitious goals include:  
First, and perhaps most important, promote private pickup. The European digital verification 
system was designed to ease citizen-government interactions, but citizens conduct one or two 
interactions each year on average with their authorities. Private sector use will be key to 
reaching its potential, allowing private businesses to speed up the rollout of their services 
across the broad EU single market.   
At present, only European governments may ‘notify’ eID schemes. Private companies should 
be able to propose solutions. New rules are required to verify the technology and process of 
private schemes and consider them as qualified trust services. Common identity verification 
standards should be instated in key pieces of legislation, as has been the case in the financial 
sector’s anti-money laundering code. This is crucial because digital verification should allow 
banks and other financial institutions to meet Know Your Customer requirements – and to 
increase the effectiveness of their efforts to combat financial fraud. 
Europe’s Single Digital Gateway will allow the automated cross-border exchange of evidence 
for public services. It, too, is restricted to public services and government-approved private 
services. The Gateway should be extended to allow private actors, under strict conditions, to 
verify some information.  
In February, 2020, a Commission Expert Group came up with other important new proposals 
designed to allow finance institutions to identify customers digitally at distance. The first report 
laments the present fragmentation of the European identification landscape and analyses 
current shortcomings and challenges.73 A second report recommends measures to allow a 
Know your Customer “based on attributes, both for customer identification and customer due 
diligence matters” that “can either be document-based (i.e. when attributes are remotely 
extracted from existing ID or CDD documents) or natively digital, where attributes are 
communicated through established IT protocols without supporting documents.”74 
 
73European Commission (2019), Report on existing remote on-boarding solutions in the banking sector: 
Assessment of risks and associated mitigating controls, including interoperability of the remote solutions - 
December 2019 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/ 
documents/report-on-existing-remote-on-boarding-solutions-in-the-banking-sector-december2019_en.pdf 
74 European Commission.(2019).,Assessing portable KYC/CDD solutions in the banking sector: The case for an 
attribute-based & LoA-rated KYC framework for the digital age - December 2019 https://ec.europa.eu/ 
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Public private schemes should be encouraged. A good example is the Netherlands’ impressive 
eHerkenning. It replaces the multiple sets of digital keys previously used by the Dutch 
government with a single token that enables organisations to make their services accessible 
online and securely to companies, civil servants and consumers. Users log in and eHerkenning 
checks whether the person using a service is actually who they say they are, and whether they 
are authorised. 
The ultimate goal should be an attribute-based verification mechanism under which citizens 
and businesses own their own data. A trusted authority, public or private, would provide 
verification. Users could share the requisite attributes – a birth date, instead of sharing the full 
copy of an ID card, or even a yes/no reply (Q: Are you above 18?  A: Yes). Microsoft, Deloitte 
and other organisations are working on such solutions. 
Second, boost innovation including the adoption of blockchain while being technology neutral.   
Blockchain offers the technical advantages of a decentralised identity model, with no storage 
on central database. It leaves individuals in control of their data. In principle, eID and eIDAS 
permit and encourage blockchain. The European Commission has sponsored the European 
Blockchain Partnership to promote a “digital identity” that protects privacy. Some 
decentralised blockchain ledgers seem to offer both data protection and security for data flows.  
Nevertheless, some uncertainty remains. For blockchain signatures to be authorised, every 
signatory may need to undergo the costly and time-consuming process required for obtaining 
a certificate.75 A European Parliament report recommends that “legal certainty for those 
wanting to use blockchain technologies is regulatory guidance regarding how specific concepts 
ought to be applied where these mechanisms are used.”76 
Blockchain should not be favoured over other technology solutions that promote simplicity, 
because data protection and user-centricity should be encouraged. Several organisations are 
currently working on this approach (see for instance the work of Mastercard on a decentralised 
interoperable digital identity model). Another good example is Fido. This public-private 
consortium has developed a cryptographic, on-device authentication that it claims is “safer and 
easier to use than passwords and one-time passcodes.”77 
Third, clarify GDPR data protection rules. Europe’s data protection authorities need to provide 
workable rules to guide both governments and the private sector in their pursuit of digital 




75  Deloitte, (2019), “Blockchain: Legal implications, questions, opportunities and risks.” 
76 Michele Finck, (2019), Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation: Can distributed ledgers be 
squared with European data protection law?, European Parliamentary Research Service. 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/634445/EPRS_STU(2019)634445_EN.pdf p. IV 
77 FIDO, (2017), “FIDO Alliance Launches European Working Group to Expand Use of Authentication 
Standards”https://fidoalliance.org/fido-alliance-launches-european-working-group-expand-use-authentication-
standards/ 
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Should there be limitations on what data can be stored and for how long? How should data 
subject rights, including the Right to be Forgotten, be implemented and enforced? 
Such reassurance could take the form of various regulatory initiatives. The European Data 
Protection Board needs to update some opinions including one on anonymisation techniques. 
A good sign is that the European Data Protection Board has announced that it will publish 
additional blockchain guidance in 2020.78 
Fourth, increase regulatory and financial incentives to accelerate digital verification. An 
example would be enabling eID/eIDAS to ease and simplify compliance with GDPR. Legally 
recognised and enforceable eID, solutions could exchange and transact with trustworthy 
identity credentials and attributes, while enforcing data minimisation and ‘need2know’ 
principles. Although the European Union should not oblige Google and Facebook and other 
tech giants to use eIDAS to verify the identity of their users, the EU should allow them to, and 
give them incentives to do so. It could promote an open European ID login standard in its 
upcoming Digital Services Act. 
Fifth, offer clarity on potential regulatory conflicts. Today, verified credentials are being reused 
outside of their initial use case. The EU Blockchain Observatory “asks for legal clarification on 
the reuse” of credentials subject to anti-money laundering and PSDII payment regulations.79 
Sixth, look at simplification. Instead of the present peer review system, a single European 
committee could review eID schemes. This unbiased eye could speed up the eID scheme review 
process and allow for private sector trusted service providers to enter the market. Although 
the committee’s decision should be final and binding, national government fears could be 
assuaged by allowing them to vet and appeal recognition of trusted service providers before 
allowing their application. 
Seventh, avoid allowing the push for digital verification to turn into digital protectionism. A 
buzz-term these days in Brussels is ‘tech sovereignty’. Debate on digital identity and verification 
should focus on the needs of European consumers and businesses rather than on the 
geopolitical considerations shaping other aspects of European tech policy. It should not be 
about escaping the grip of large US and Chinese tech companies, nor should it be mixed up with 
dreams of creating a European data cloud or other industrial initiatives. It should be kept apart 
from a new Digital Services Act and other upcoming regulations designed to compel digital 
giants to take on more responsibility for what they host on their platforms.  
Once Covid-19 subsides, Europe will need to reignite its economy. Digital identity and 
verification should play a key role.  
  
 
78 European Data Protection Board (2019), “EDPB Work Program 2019/2020.” https://edpb.europa.eu/ 
sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb-2019-02-12plen-2.1edpb_work_program_en.pdf 
79 T. Lyons, L. Courcelas, & K. Timsit, (2019), Blockchain and Digital Identity, The European Union Blockchain 
Observatory and Forum. 
EUROPE’S DIGITAL IDENTIFICATION OPPORTUNITY | 21 
 
Case Study: 
Belgium - Leveraging Digital Verification 
In Brussels, a patient hands over a prescription to a pharmacist. The face value of the 
medication is €50. Before paying, the patient hands the pharmacist his/her Belgian identity 
card. The government’s subsidy is deducted, and the patient only pays €15, for example. 
This time and money-saving exchange is made possible thanks to the innovative Belgian digital 
electronic identity card. More than perhaps any other European Union country, Belgium has 
leveraged digital identity for both public and private use. Its success shows what already is 
possible – and what remains to be done. 
Belgium enjoys a longstanding system for identifying its citizens, dating back to Napoleonic 
times. During the 19th century, the newly independent country developed a civil registry, where 
all citizens and new-born children were required to be registered in a centralised database. 
Unlike in other countries such as the United States and United Kingdom, both of which have no 
single national identity cards, citizens trust the government to keep a record of their identity.  
Today, each Belgian new-born is assigned a unique number that is carried throughout his or 
her life. This is mandatory, not voluntary. The national registry number contains, or links to 
personal information such as his or her mother and father, marital status, home address, and 
financial information, including tax payments. It allows an almost unlimited amount of personal 
information and credentials to be stored in a secure government database – and potentially 
shared for verification - through a citizen’s identification number. 
 
The rollout has been steady. In 2003, Belgium began issuing chip-based ID cards, replacing its 
previous paper-based cards. By 2008, every Belgian citizen over the age of 12 held an ID card 
that streamlines access to digitised government services. Belgian citizens under 12 years-old 
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carry a Kids card, which only allows for qualified electronic signatures and authentication. The 
total number of cards issued numbers 115% of Belgian citizens, because it includes foreigners 
holding residency permits.  
 
The card’s utility has expanded over time. The first government service to go online was taxes 
– and almost all Belgians now file electronically via Tax-on-Web. More services such as health 
are being added at a regular pace. Until November 2018, only the government was authorised 
to process stored data. A new law permits the private sector to take advantage, provided the 
government accepts the use case and the private companies receive GDPR-compliant consent 
from their clients. It is too early to judge.  
Originally, a card reader was required to use the eID card. Today, a web app called Itsme® allows 
mobile phone access.80 It replaces card-readers, passwords and tokens with a single five-digit 
personal code. All you have to do is log in using your personal Itsme® code or fingerprint. About 
17.5% of all logins for government transactions now come via Itsme®, and 21% of Belgian 
citizens reported that they will use Itsme® for filing taxes in the next tax reporting period.81 
Other ground-breaking experiments are taking place. The city of Antwerp has launched a 
decentralised blockchain pilot that allows individuals to decide with whom data is shared. The 
Port of Antwerp is also leveraging blockchain to create a ‘smart’ port, speeding up logistics of 




80 Itsme (2019), “Tax-on-web with itsme® making strong progress in Belgium: easy to use, secure and recognised 
by the government.” 
81 Ibid. 
82 Port of Antwerp, (2017), “Smart port with blockchain.” 
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Case Study: 
A Nordic Success Story 
by Geoff Skelly 
In Europe’s north, it is almost as easy to buy a house online as it is to buy a book. Finns, Swedes, 
Danes, Norwegians and Icelanders can apply for and sign loan documents without even leaving 
their couch. The entire process of approving or denying a mortgage application takes two to 
three minutes. 
Just as the Nordics are renowned for building a comprehensive welfare state on top of free-
trade-minded market economies, they are solving digital verification through a combined 
pragmatic public and private-sector effort. Financial institutions have created identity systems 
called BankID, which the government recognise as legally binding for documents, transactions 
and other operations, both public and private. In Sweden alone, the digital BankID has 7.5 
million users – almost the entire adult population. The BankIDs work well across the Nordic 
borders. According to a Ramboll Consultancy Study the value of the Nordic eID system reaches 
€17 billion annually.83  
Unlike Belgium, where the government built upon its own central population registry, the 
Nordics distrust government-controlled citizen identification. This opened the door to private-
sector solutions. The most popular and successful method leveraged the infrastructure of 
private banks. During the 1980s, Nordic banks needed a way to verify the identity of the person 
cashing a cheque, so they began issuing physical ID cards. The banks soon digitised the ID card, 
allowing it to be updated and verify a client’s financial information. Banks soon realised their 
identification technology could be leveraged to ease non-banking tasks, and Nordic citizens 
began using their bank ID card (not a card, but a mobile phone solution) to perform a wide 
variety of tasks. 
Governments picked up on the opportunity. In 2017, the Nordic Council and the Council of 
Ministers created the Council of Ministers in Digitisation to lead Nordic efforts on issues relating 
to eID and cross-border operability. The Nordic Council of Ministers in Digitisation agreed to 
utilise the existing bank infrastructure to install eID, permitting the bank ID system to access 
government programmes. In Norway and Sweden, the eID scheme is called BankID, while in 
Finland it is called MobileID, and in Denmark the NemID. Despite the different names, all these 
public ID systems verify identity through information accessed by a bank card.  
 
83 L. van Marion, & J.H. Hovland, (2015), The Nordic Digital Ecosystem: Actors, Strategies, Opportunities”, Nordic 
Innovation, Oslo.  
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In Norway and Denmark, uptake is well over 90%, with citizens using their bank identity 
solutions, on average, once every two days. That adds up to 150 million times a year. Nordic 
governments have bolstered the system’s utility by increasing online public services from 200 
to 3,000. Today, the BankID allows Nordic access a broad range of public services, from online 
tax-filing to transferring academic records when applying to international schools.  
Private sector use is booming. Because all banks in Norway use the same eID, a Norwegian 
citizen can access or even open a bank account at any Norwegian bank from anywhere in the 
world. All Norwegian banks accept the same BankID, allowing almost all financial transactions 
to be done digitally.  
The Nordic identification system is considered a semi-centralised, federated system. This 
means there are multiple, government-endorsed digital identity providers that compete in an 
open market for customer service. Citizens are able to choose from a multitude of trusted 
identity providers, varying from banks to mobile operators. In Norway, 90% of identification is 
done through BankID while the remaining 10% is done by private companies that specialise in 
verification, like Buypass or Signicat.  
These companies play an important role because they provide additional options for B2B 
verification when BankID is not an option. Despite large investments in digital identification 
across the EU, 2019 revealed that 38% of all European financial service applications are 
abandoned due to verification challenges. These third-party verification providers are 
necessarily filling this gap by providing more options to citizens.  
The next step is to expand the system beyond the northern region. The Nordic region is already 
partnering up with Baltic nations – Europe’s first multi-regional digital network. As the clear 
front-runner, the rest of Europe should look to the north as a roadmap for a pan-European 
solution to the digital verification challenge. 
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Case Study: 
UK e-Verification Struggles 
by Justin Jin 
When the UK government launched GOV.UK Verify in 2011, supporters billed it as a 
revolutionary digital verification tool. It would not depend on an open-to-abuse central 
government citizen database. The private sector would drive a decentralised operation, with 
competition making it cheap and effective.  
Instead, Verify.gov has struggled. Pickup is low, both in the private and public sectors. The 
system suffers from a complicated authentication process – and most of all, from its voluntary 
rather than mandatory mandate. 
Part of the specific UK challenge is historical. Unlike many other European countries, the UK 
has never had a centralised government ID database or national identification system, for fear 
of government overreach. Attempts to produce one generated significant political pushback.  
Without a single institution able to command the trust of a large majority of the British public, 
digital identity efforts allow only niche applications. A national insurance number is required to 
receive state pension and other benefit payments but is not legally permitted to be used as a 
form of ID for other operations. The National Health System Card and authentication for the 
Gateway tax platform allow access to their individual narrow silos. None of the systems is 
interoperable.  
GOV.UK Verify was created to respond to the same challenges as the National Identity cards, 
except in a more politically palatable form. Rather than a centralised database, it relied on a 
federated system of databases, each providing access when absolutely needed to confirm a 
user’s identity.84 A user paying their taxes through GOV.UK Verify would register or log in on 
the website in a process not unlike registering or logging in to a bank account.  
A Labour government attempted reform in 2006 with the passage of the Identity Cards Act. It 
proposed combining biometric and property information, connecting the resulting profile to an 
identity card which, as Tony McNulty, the then Home Office Minister stated, would “be a 
panacea for identity fraud, for benefit fraud, terrorism, entitlement and access to public 
services”.85 Ministers claimed that the consolidation of identification methods would save 
 
84 E.A. Whitley, (2018), “Trusted Digital Identity Provision: GOV.UK Verify’s Federated Approach.” Center for Global 
Development. CGD Policy Paper 131. November.  
85 BBC News, (2005), “Labour admits ID card ‘oversell’”, 4 August.  
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anywhere from £650 million to 1.1 billion per year, as well as disrupting organised crime and 
terrorism.86 
Identity Card fell short of those expectations. Beyond the inevitable data protection and human 
rights issues raised by a centralised government database linking biometric, residential, and 
potentially criminal records with huge swathes of other personal information from a host of 
government databases, and widespread fears of discrimination against minorities, the 
technology was buggy and unreliable.87 Some 31% of people were unable to verify their 
identities with facial recognition and around 20% of all people were unable to verify their 
identities using their fingerprints.88 The database itself was not secure; some 25 million records 
were lost in 2007. After the 2010 elections, which brought the Conservatives to power, the 
project was ended. 
Government projections were far too optimistic. A 90%+ identification success rate was 
predicted, with 25 million users and 19 government agencies signing up for GOV UK.Verify by 
2020. Instead, the latest available figures show only 3.6 million users, 11 agencies signed up 
and a success rate of only 48%.89 
Many agencies, including the Gateway tax portal and the National Health System card, declined 
to join and established their own, separate standards and platforms. Even for an unsuccessful 
government infrastructure project, Verify was “unusually bad,” says Pauline Ngan and Sian 
Jones of the National Audit Office in an interview, and one of two to receive a red flag from the 
Infrastructure Projects Authority in 2018.90 
After billions of pounds spent, the UK identification space remains fragmented across Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. The Scottish government has announced a project aiming to 




86 Home Office Identity & Passport Service, (2007), What are the benefits of the National Identity Scheme?  
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89 C. Burt, (2016), “Gov.UK digital ID service has fraction of intended users and verifies less than half successfully.” 
Biometric Update, 6 March.  
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Case Study: 
Digital Identity Around the Globe 
by Justin Jin 
No magic bullet single formula exists for building a secure, privacy-protective digital identity 
scheme. Around the world, three different types of digital verification systems have emerged, 
from a centralised government-driven system such as the one in Belgium to the private 
operations run by American and Chinese tech giants Google, Facebook, Tencent and Alibaba.  
Different types of transactions require different levels of authentication; the greater the risk of 
the transaction, the greater the assurance level required. In the Google and Facebook model, 
users choose their own digital identity and no verification against official identity document. 
This seems appropriate for the low-risk application of checking the social media network. It is 
not considered secure enough for high-risk transactions such as collecting benefits, which 
require “possession of a secure device, such as a physical token, a mobile phone, or a 
smartcard” to provide stronger security and a World Bank report finds “no examples of 
countries that have considered this (Google-Facebook) approach to provide access to their 
digital services”.91 
Government-driven, centralised systems are the most common. In addition to Belgium, Nigeria 
and India operate such a system. India’s is the world’s largest, with more than a billion people 
and more than 90% of their population enrolled. Called Aadhar, it authenticates access to a 
wide variety of government services, from rural employment systems to food security systems 
to pensions.92 The government is pushing to link a wide range of private services, from bank 
accounts to HIV treatment.93 
Aadhaar demonstrates the value of making enrolment easy. It accepts a wide range of 
documents to prove identity and address – including options for those who lack prior 
identification documents. Enrolment is free and mobile centres accept rural residents.94 
But Aadhar’s ambitious scope raises deep privacy concerns. Indian Supreme Court has 
prohibited mandatory enrolment in Aadhar and discrimination in services to those without an 
Aadhar number.95 Aadhar does not count as proof of citizenship or residence. Given the recent 
controversies over citizenship and identity in India, Aadhar may soon become another 
flashpoint.  
By contrast, the American digital identity system is decentralised, with no national scheme. It 
is an open marketplace of verification providers, each of which is accepted for different levels 
of verification. On the public side, login.gov, formerly known as the Federal Cloud Credential 
 
91 Clark et al., op. cit. 
92 K. Deepalakshimi, (2017), “The long list of Aadhar-linked schemes”, The Hindu, 24 March. 
93 M. Rao, (2017), “Why Aadhaar is prompting HIV positive people to drop out of treatment programmes across 
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94 World Economic Forum,(2018), Identity in a Digital World A new chapter in the social contract. Cologny/Geneva. 
95 HT Correspondents, (2013), “No person should suffer for not getting Aadhaar: SC.” 24 Sep 2013, Hindustan Times 
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Exchange (FCCX), streamlines access to expedited airport security check-in, and allows 
candidates for jobs in the Customs and Border Patrol. 
Private credit-rating companies such as Equifax, which collects financial data tied to a single 
identity, are equally important identity verification providers. They generally work with financial 
institutions looking to confirm the existence of prospective borrowers. A host of other, smaller 
identification providers for various services, all of which are governed by government issued 
standards known as Know your Customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering (AML).96 
Mixed public-private, semi-centralised federated systems are the most prevalent, and include 
the various Nordic BankIDs and the UK’s GOV.UK Verify. Under such programmes, the 
government recognises several digital identity providers, including private sector players such 
as banks or mobile operators. Citizens are free to choose between them. Another example is 
the system used in Australia. The country has two major portals, Digital ID and myGov.id, both 
of which can be used to access government services. Neither depends on a physical card. 
Government agencies including the Post Office and Department of Defence as well as private 
companies like DigiCert provide authentication.  
China’s digital identity system represents a controversial model. Tencent’s WeChat and 
Alibaba’s AliExpress serve as aggregators, allowing consumers to connect their bank accounts, 
personal social media, and government identity. Both use text message and biometric photo 
authentication. Once authenticated, the app allows a wide variety of transactions, from 
purchases to investment to paying government fines. In some regions, like Guangzhou, the 
government has agreed to allow a trial of WeChat as official government identification.97  
Today, WeChat functions as financial artery of the Chinese economy. Cash and credit cards 
have been almost entirely displaced as methods of payment, and WeChat is accepted 
everywhere from high-end restaurants to humble street vendors. The Chinese government has 
begun linking state service provision to these apps, including identification for entering and 
exiting Hong Kong. Instant verification of consumer identity is possible due to connection of 
government-issued ID to account. Business accounts are allowed, functioning in much the same 
way as an individual account for purposes of verification, albeit with business documentation 
instead of personal documentation required.  
The big cloud hanging over China is, of course, its authoritarian government. China’s communist 
authorities use access to these private authentication systems to enforce their one-party rule. 
In Xinjiang, home to a Muslim Uighur province, police scan identification cards, taking 
photographs and fingerprints, and searching cell phones. In some cities, like Kashgar in western 
Xinjiang, police checkpoints and facial-recognition cameras are omnipresent.98 The 
government also collects and stores citizens’ biometric data through a required programme 
advertised as Physicals for All.99 
 
96 Trulioo. (2019), “KYC: 3 steps to effective Know Your Customer compliance.”  
97 Rohaidi, N. (2018), “Guangzhou now uses WeChat for digital identity”, Gov Insider, 10 January.  
98 Wee, S. (2019), “China Uses DNA to Track Its People, With the Help of American Expertise.” The New York Times. 
21 February. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-fisher.html 
99 Ibid. 
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